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CULTUROLOGY

THE POLITICAL NATURE OF UKRAINE'S RUSSIFICATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF THE TERM RUSSIAN-SPEAKING UKRAINIAN AS A DESTRUCTIVE ETHNOCULTURAL FACTOR

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Abstract

The essay demonstrates political component of Russian language and culture dissemination in the Ukraine, the nature of the synthetic atomization of society and the separation of Russian-speaking Ukrainians as an independent part of society, which is destructive attitude towards the nation. Political events and the war with the Russian Federation have shown the importance of taking into account the political factor of social ethnic identification in the first place, and demonstrated the need for a clear demarcation of the nation and diasporas in the country that has previously gone through the historic phase of Russification and the destruction of an autochthonous culture.

Keywords: Ukrainian culture, Russian culture, Russian culture bearer, disinformation, irrational reality.

Linguistic and cultural identity in the former Soviet Union and Ukraine is often researched without taking into account the prior methods and consequences of the Russification policy that took place and remains as the major external influence on the formation of cultural space in the present and historical perspective. The analysis of Russian-speaking people among the population of the Ukraine and rest of the ex-USSR countries should take into account the actual ethnic identity of the carriers of Russian culture and language, consider the dynamics of the processes of the formation and spread of the Russian language in the context of political influence, the result of the authoritarian political system aimed at the destruction of national-cultural identity, the forced Moscow substitution of an autochthonous culture with Russian, as during the Soviet Union as in the modern era. Dehumanization of a large scale in the information space, the physical threats of a direct military invasion from Russia, the actual state of Ukrainian culture in the occupied territories are affecting people forcing them to submit to major threat, and this influence cannot be ignored or considered a normal part of the cultural reanimation and restoring of sustainable culture (Yekelchik 1999). Russification, as part of the political conquest of Moscow is not a natural spread of the culture to ex-USSR countries. In addition, the Russian political model excludes the possibility of frank discussion of the suppression, forced cultural influence and crimes against humanity that took place before and were used again since 2014. Instead Russia conceal current geopolitical goals, avoid any discussion of the linguistic situation, they mislead and frankly deceives external observers, defending their own political interests.

Cultural and ethnic identification and self-identification for ex-USSR countries including Ukraine can not be considered apart from the historical-political context and the present threats and terror from Russian. For example, we can not investigate the cultural differences in the population of North and South Korea, excluding the political impact of events on people, moreover, if we exclude exterior factors in Korean war 1950-1953 and study only an ethnic component, in this case the division of Korea would be shown as a civil war, that is not corresponding to reality. From the other

hand here, we can not agree with Communist attempt to unite 'proletarians are as one nation', despite Moscow had manipulative support of communist ideas with force and lies they spread in societies, spreading their own cultural influence also. The Communist regime in the USSR set the goal of embracing the world with 'proletarian revolutions', while seizing power in the countries they destroyed the personal space of people, wiped out the nation to create a 'Soviet man'. In fact, this purpose is similar to the Nazi's regime Aryan nation and cultural domination over other non-Germanic peoples. But Nazism ideology felt after World War II, Germany undergone denazification and the negative attitude toward Nazism was accepted by the world. Still the destruction of non-Russian cultures in occupied countries of the USSR and the Russian Federation remains only debatable issues. Interaction of communism with the world was based on disinformation and people manipulation. Moscow's action against neighboring nations should be taken into account for any cultural investigation of ex-USSR countries, in fact the current 'hybrid' Ukrainian - Russian is the first real step toward Ukrainians nation reanimation, and the beginning of normalization of Moscow culture influence on Ukraine.

Ammon Cheskin and Angela Kachuyevski emphasize analyze on the types of ethnic co-relationships as 'T' and 'L' type throw self identification as - "we" and "they", but Ukraine has undergone period of 'Soviet people' creation, the linguistic-cultural identity was distorted by external political processes and modern synthetic and politicized separation of the Ukrainian population into "Russian-speaking Ukrainians". It has nothing in common with ethnic self-identification and should be studied either as a unique phenomenon of a mixed nation or as a result of brutal Moscow's policy towards non-Russian nations (Cheskin, Kachuyevski 2018). Russian-speaking people among Ukrainians are not a unique phenomenon, Russian language was politically implemented into all the countries of the former USSR with wide range of methods including ethnocide, only the Baltic States used an opportunity for the national restoration and helped forming a natural diaspora of Russians also for those who did not want or could not become a part of a national country. And by

2014 Russian diaspora in Baltic states demonstrated, unwillingness of political destabilization for political purpose to 'protect the Russian-speaking population', but in Ukraine this thesis and political element of destabilization was used to synthetic division and atomization of Ukrainian society in 2014, that helped Russia to conceal invasion and start undeclared war.

Some political elites in Ukraine helped this covert thesis to exist due to the prior occupation of Ukraine, when a significant percentage of the central and regional elites were formed thought Soviet paradigms with despise to national self-consciousness, support of the Soviet ideas regarding Ukrainian culture as a "hostile element". From 1991 till 2014 Ukrainians used to populism and lies of the main political elites, which shifted their public position to everything possible just to stay at power. They used any means to manipulate the population using also Moscow's 'linguistic separation' thesis at a wide scale. As a result, the Party of Regions and President Yanukovich became the apotheosis of an anti-national idea in Ukraine, which led to the weakening of the country, atomized society and created conditions for the military aggression of Russia and for the ongoing occupation of part of the country.

In a course of history Moscow's artificially and with brutal methods spreaded the Russian language in Ukraine, in particular - through the destruction of the nationally conscious part of the population, and the prohibition of all Ukrainian literary, dramatic and oral work; through the elimination of Ukrainian culture centers in the Ukrainian places of residence; through the arrest of Ukrainian scholars and clergy, and their replacement with Russian representatives. The process of Russification took place through the compulsory study of Russian language and literature in Ukraine schools, through monetary supplement of Russian teachers. Ukrainians schools were closed and replaced with Russian schools, Moscow ordered transition of existing Ukrainian schools to the Russian language. There deported the population of Ukraine beyond its borders, made changes into the Ukrainian spelling to bring it closer to Russian, Ukraine workers who were removed during the war with their factories were forbidden to return home. For decades Moscow repressed Ukrainian culture defenders, dehumanized the Ukrainian people in general, writing and scientific theses had to be only in Russian, and those scientific works were approved in Moscow only, all Ukrainian scientific and fictional works were undergoing censorship and national culture was considered 'hostile element'. Even after the collapse of the USSR, Moscow was preparing to defend its gains in promoting Russian culture, for CIS countries the Russian language meant to be the only official language. Only the Baltic States prevented this by allowing citizens to clearly self-identify and identify themselves as they want, thereby effectively preventing (casus belli) the reason for the war that the Russian Federation used against Ukraine in 2014.

Also we can not ignore the contemporary political influence on the population of Ukraine - the occupation of Crimea and East of the Ukraine, ongoing war in the

east, Moscow's official position on 'protecting Russian-speakers, constant threat of a full-scale Russian invasion, destructive role of pro-Russian mass media and social networks, ongoing dehumanization of Ukrainian national consciousness. Spreads of fear and language of hatred in social networks continues, the Russian Federation media and their cultural product, are continue to put numerous controversies in the Ukrainian society, paralyzing sustainable linguistic and cultural restoration. And these actions have the goal not to protect Russian culture, but on the contrary, brings threat to the population of Ukraine despite ethnic self-identification (Nozhenko 2006); in fact, an aggressive attitude towards Ukrainian culture and language is spread, people living in Ukraine are dehumanized and Ukrainian nation is threatened with destruction on an example of Crimea occupation in 2014 and a crushing attitude of "Army DPR-LPR" towards Ukrainian culture.

This new irrational reality world is a dangerous place, as there are a number of people who accept as normal occupying a sovereign territory on the basis of cultural influence, ignoring borders, breaking up agreements, forgetting forceful methods of 'Russification' and ethnocide crimes against Ukrainians in the 20th century. So both in media and in propaganda **Russian culture bearers are individuals whose cultural self-identification is based on modern or classical Russian culture and they reflect national, linguistic or social connection to Russians but not to another country or nation, even if they do not belong to the Russian nation.** Self-identification reflects a real situation, when cultural affinity influences both political decisions and public opinion of those people, while widely used 'Russian speaking people' is incorrect and used in propaganda against Ukraine only to involve more people in hate-speech. From Russian ethno-social politics, we can say that there are two important trends:

- they want a nation to be identified only by a language spoken without any historical or ethnic background, just for a language;

- calling people who speak Russian but are not ethnic Russians or Russian citizens as those people to be identified from outside as Russians or as specific 'third' category of nation that is mixed and is 'half Russian-half Ukrainian'.

It is done constantly but on the example of Ukrainian events in 2014-2018 we see that they in fact converted the language in culture identifier for exterior observers and used passionate Russian culture bearers as collaborates in the warfare against Ukraine and the Ukrainian nation.

Under such circumstances it is impossible to investigate the identity and cultural situation without political influence of Moscow not only in the occupied territories but also throughout Ukraine, at least until the aggressor retreat, formally recognize his own defeat, Russian leaders will be sentenced to international the courts and Russian Federation refuse from aggressive expansion and future "protection of Russian-speaking" (ie, the destruction of non-Russian cultures and languages). On the example of Baltic states we see that ethno-cultural normalization is possible after nation recognizes the consequences of past crimes, fight of the

interference in the interior restoration of the cultural heritage. While the Russian Federation policy on "protecting" people who speak Russian does not protect people from the pressure, but the use of Russian as the main language of communication in the society and is directed to the mandatory need to know exclusively Russian language for communication and not to know another, in including Ukrainian in Ukraine. Thus, given the current state and the spread of Russian, the forced depression of the Ukrainian language and culture, the Russian Federation denies Ukrainians the right to own and use their own Ukrainian language in their own country. This principle is created by historical events and is supported by modern political processes. And the proliferation of Russian culture continues with all means, including military aggression and annexation, the possession of the population in Russian, and its free origination is becoming a factor against the autochthonous culture. The abandonment of native language and culture leads to slowing down of its development, worsens the economic development of culture carriers, as a proxy army of the DPR-LNR and directly by the Russian Federation uses intimidation, mockery of the carriers of Ukrainian culture, has defined its own cultural influence factor as a sufficient reason for intervention in the internal policies, including the threat of a full-scale and ongoing covert war, and occupation.

It is Ukraine's refusal to protect its own cultural space, the lack of political will to weaken the dominance of the Russian language and culture, the absence of a national security policy to protect its own culture, and this led to the further synthetic spread of the Russian language and culture as a factor of destabilization of society in Ukraine, and eventually to the official cause annexation of territory and military conflict. This gives the aggressor an opportunity to actually hide the war with Ukraine, the Russian disinformation legend "Russian-language civil war against Ukrainian-language".

And when considering political influence of the Russian federation on neighboring countries, which were clearly demonstrated in Georgia and Ukraine we want to outline the main components that the Russian Federation uses to create a conflict among ex-USSR countries that are its political and cultural adversaries. First, the Russian Federation prevails over all former USSR countries both in military-political potential, and in economic power, in the demographic aspect. Russia has nuclear weapons, which they repeatedly mentioned as an element of military might they would definitely use in the mass media at the beginning of the aggression in Ukraine in 2014. None of the former USSR countries separately can be equal to the of the Russian Federation in any of these aspects.

Secondly, the policy pursued in the Russian Empire and in the USSR was aimed at dehumanizing a different, non-Russian nation, replacing the autochthonous culture with Russian, destructing the resistance with all means possible, including the genocide. And unlike the victims of Nazism, the victims of the communist regime are still considered to be the subject of debate and aggressor is a partner for this discussions. Russia continues the policy of destroying neighboring

nations after USSR crush, and the lack of an unambiguous answer to the aggressor and the neutrality of external observers is a crime of non-interference for the destiny of these nations and future political events that will occur if countries fall to Russia command again.

Thirdly, it is Russia that undoubtedly uses its own strength and is interested in the lack of symmetrical reaction from the world democracies, having strong positions for further interfering in the interior affairs and life of neighboring countries citizens, it uses all means available including war and annexation and war with Ukraine and Georgia demonstrated it clearly. For Ukraine the cultural influence is used as an official reason for war - **casus belli** for Russian-Ukrainian war 2014, invasion and occupation are used to impose Russian cultural and social dominance. Disinformation in Russian military campaign creates discourse and deepens the dissonance, expanding Russian culture and leveling out the national culture and language in the victim country. Since 2014, the information war and disinformation campaign of the Russian Federation intervention in most popular information sources - creating conspiracy theories, spreads information on non-existent events, thus distorting actual reality, the political "war of edits" has started in Wikipedia, massive Russian propaganda content is spread in blogs and video-streams, fake accounts in social networks are created to controverse the event to the highest emotional degree, etc. (Pomerantsev, Weiss).

Let's single out several criteria of the occupation regime that influenced the consciousness of people and the state of Ukraine. The first and most important criterion is Russification and ethnocide, which was hidden behind the ideology of communism about "equality of peoples" (Laver 2004; Cloud 1975). Russification as an instrument of assimilation was widely used by the Russian Empire and the USSR, which demonstrates the complete assimilation of the small peoples (Rodkiewicz 1998; Polvinen 2007; Staliūnas 2007). Afterwards the policy of "Russification" under the USSR has been substantially expanded in methods including the Holodomor, the mass migration of autochthonous peoples beyond the borders of their own country, eradication of native cultural elites (Scherbak 1997).

Russian Federation defines the language as a sign of belonging of people of any nationality to "Russians" regardless of their origin, country of residence, or any other features, which is similar to 'Soviet nation' type. This is clearly seen on the example of the formation of a linguistic space in the Russian Federation itself, which is known to have about 100 different languages from 14 different language families (Alpatov 2005), the Russian is introduced as the main state language in order to replace the native cultures of autochthonous peoples and erase their identity.

The same politics was held towards all peoples in the Moscow conquered countries in the USSR, not only as a factor of cultural influence on the former Soviet Union, but as a factor in ethnic identity, attitude towards carriers, political manipulation, and intentional double-mindedness in defining nationalities in the USSR. In Ukraine, as in the rest of the post Soviet countries without policy of protecting national culture, the

Russian language replaces the national. Undoubtedly, it is impossible to resolve the issue of protecting the cultural environment in Ukraine by radical methods, but stabilizing and restoring Ukrainian culture is a matter of national security.

By 2014, the Russification of Ukraine was not considered by people as a threat to Ukraine's statehood, but as Russia began invading Crimea and the East of Ukraine, declaring interests of taking over Donetsk, Luhansk, Kharkiv, Mykolayiv, Zaporizhye, Kherson and Odesa regions with one proclaimed reason - to protect the Russian-speaking population. However, the dynamics of the processes launched by the RF testifies, however, absence of wide support to physically eradicate Ukrainians, despite extreme aggression and hate speech that Russian mass media motivated people to kill with the main reason for aggression was the so-called "Russian-speaking protection". Russian Federation proclaimed *casus belli* as "protection of Russian speaking" Ukrainians, but armed warfare itself was initiated as part of the Russian military invasion itself. And as a part of this war, disinformation campaign repeated thesis about Ukraine inner cultural and language conflict, as a cover-ops in mass media to disguise invasion and distort understanding of the situation.

And as we see on the example of Ukraine, tactics of war was: to bring culture in; do their best to widespread and even dominate it; officially claim a political threat to "Russian culture bearers" and then proclaim the necessity to protect people with all means including military. Russian culture bearers may not be connected to the aggressor by any trait: not as citizens, not as ethnic Russians, not even as Russian supporters – but they were adapted in Russian culture, they accept imperialistic visions of USSR, sometimes they understand and speak Russian. And since 2014 this is a sufficient reason for every country to be invaded by another country, especially if country is weakened with any political events. On 24 June 2014 Putin said "Russia will always protect ethnic Russians in Ukraine and those Ukrainian people who feel not only the ethnical but cultural and linguistic connection towards Russia, those who feel themselves a part of Russian world" ('Natsionalnyi aktsent', 2014; 'BBC News Russkaya sluzhba', 2014). And it is not just an idea - to interpret the term 'ethnos' in such a way, but this is a precedent, if left unpunished and ignored, can be used by any aggressor, as a reason to claim 'casus belli'. The world will never be the same after the interpretation of 'ethnos' in this way, as this interpretation ignores national self-identification for all the countries and nations.

And Moscow has not only made Russian culture a 'casus belli', they clearly stated that if someone claims himself Russian on any territory, then the Russian Federation can use their troops to "pacify" a foreign nation and protect those self-proclaimed 'Russians'. Moscow clearly stated, that they will do anything including usage of military force, to 'protect' anyone who publicly sympathize Russians. ('Russia today', 2014; 'Sovyet Federatsii Federalnogo Sobraniya Rossiyskoy Federatsii', 2014). They created a new idea and are constantly repeating that thesis about "language and culture" to further destabilization of national countries, use

distorted meaning to denounce previous agreements and wage a war for territories and expansion. And this thesis is constantly repeated on all levels of communication including official ones, recently 'Russian culture bearers' were named the main reason to annex Crimea, as Italian ambassador in Ukraine Salvini said: 'There are some historically Russian areas, in which there are a Russian culture and tradition, and which therefore legitimately belong to the Russian Federation,' when admitting the reason why he considered Crimea a legally Russian territory (Curridori 2018). The way Russian government spread disinformation in Ukraine, attempting to recruit militants and to break Ukrainian society from inside, using mass and social-media became a precedent, political instrument and example for modern informational warfare (Etter L., 2017).

From June 25, 2014, the war with the Russian Federation received all the characteristics of the fourth generation of war, although in fact the date of its beginning can be considered as the period from February 20 to 27, 2014. According to the declared intentions, the Russian Federation has not achieved its goals and will continue the war, President Putin called the official pretext for the military aggression to penetrate and replace the Ukrainian national culture with the Russian imperial world perception. For Ukraine, since 2014, the issue of linguistic identity has put the strategic need to preserve the integrity of the cultural and linguistic space to prevent the emergence of social instability, the loss of political control and direct military aggression from the Russian Federation. Various methods of influence are aimed at mild "unwinding" of the population on destructive actions, loss of manageability and creation of conditions and reasons for military aggression of the Russian Federation under the slogan "protection of Russian-speakers". And the creation of a "sufficient reason" for the Russian attack was publicly voiced in the slogans of Russian politicians, the media, the figures of Russian culture, and backed up by the military's own actions on the occupation of the Crimea and the eastern part of Ukraine. In addition to Ukraine, the cultural factor and "linguistic and ethnic identity" were used to start the war, forming same marginal "Donetsk/Lugansk republics" as before - Transnistria, North Ossetia and Abkhazia. The Russification of Königsberg and the dissemination of cultural values of the Russian Federation extends influence on Germany. Since 2014 for Russia, the language and distribution of Russian culture is "casus belli" and after the occupation of Crimea, no country can feel safe. The distribution of the Russian language is carried out as a lesser language *de jure*, but *de facto* is aimed to be recognition as the main language. At the same time, the resistance to expansion of Russian cultural, attempts to keep it within the framework of smaller languages, leads to aggressive rhetoric from the Russian Federation, which hides further military and geopolitical goals "protecting Russia."

In no way should Russians receive more rights than other small languages in Ukraine and should be in the framework of international legislation on small languages. The universal state should only be for the au-

tochthonous language. This is a question of national security of any territorial territory close to the Russian Federation, and Ukraine is not an exception. The current distribution of Russian was not as natural or diaspora, but mainly by conquered territories and Russification, genocide and the resettlement of peoples in and out of the Ukraine. The dehumanization of other non-Russian cultures and languages was distinct and extremely angry in the Soviet period, however, the negative chauvinistic attitude of the Russians towards the rest of the nation's remains. Here is what Orest Subtelny says about this: "Another method that he used was the regime for russification in Ukraine, was to encourage the resettlement of Russians here and the Ukrainians' eviction." (Subtelny 1993). But Jacob Ornstein "as a result of this policy, the social prestige of the Ukrainian language dropped sharply, while the Russians, on the contrary, rose. Thus, Ukrainian emigrants in the West testified that the use of the Ukrainian language as an educated citizen was perceived not merely as a *mauvais ton*, but as a manifestation of nationalism, an act of political disobedience. The Ukrainian-speaking respondent told me how he was forced to change his language to Russian while he was taking care of a girl-woman, so that he would not be described as a "village bourgeois" (Ornstein 1959). As a result, Russians and other people who recognized themselves as Russians to get rid of bullying and much serious problems increased in Ukraine from 9% in 1926 to 22% in 1989.

The constancy of institutions set up by the Russians in their hatred policies is manifested in particular in relation to the Russian ethnos to the outside world from 2014, when Ukrainian culture and Ukrainians in the occupied territories were dehumanized, destroyed and changed into Russian. The hysteria of Crimean Mashru and V. Putin's political support in the spring of 2014 in social networks and personal communication have clearly demonstrated unqualified, sincere hatred towards the Ukrainian language and culture. As some researchers consider resentment of Russian culture and Russians to the rest of the world, has a long historical period (Guseinov 2001). The total hatred to another culture, especially to one free from the violent influence of Moscow, became the main feature of Russian politics, which designed popular hatred for the destruction of other cultures in the conquered territories (Medvedev 2014).

National-cultural aspect in this conquest plays a major role. The background for the war in Ukraine was "to protect the Russian speaking people". But narrative 'Russian speaking' is distorting understanding the situation for the outer world. In fact, there never was a language problem in Ukraine prevented understanding among people, division of the Ukrainians on parts that cannot to communicate with each other due to different common languages. In fact, Ukrainians both know and speak as their native language as Russian. Ukrainian language is the only state official language, it is taught in schools and Universities, all movies are shown in Ukrainian, before the 2014 only discomfort for people in switching from one to another was known. Russian Federation did their best to widen own culture to ex-

USSR countries, including Ukraine. The cultural situation on the territory of Ukraine was distorted due to the Russian occupation, assimilation and dehumanization of Ukrainian nation and culture for 400 years, known acts of ethnocide against Ukrainians in central and Eastern Ukraine in the 20th century (Khmara, 1975). And while Ukrainian culture was oppressed and destroyed, Russian culture and language was spread instead. More affected were big cities and, considering geography, 'Russification' effect was stronger on the territories that remained under Moscow's control for a longer period of time, constantly destroying and substituting native Ukrainian culture.

This culture projection is done with little effort as in public opinion term 'Russians' is not equal to the 'Russian nation', but to a person that was educated in Russian culture and accepts it as native, no matter which nation he or she is in fact. "Russian" is an imperialistic characteristic and self-identification as a part of the Russian Federation, the USSR, the Russian Empire etc. with expansionist intends towards the world and rejection of true self-identification. Specifics of Russian culture is deceiving "others, hostile, all other nations as conquered as other not yet", resentment, expansionism. It comes out to be the fundamental rule – to bear torture and torture others. Communism is an apotheosis of anti-individualism and "ressentiment without glory/respect/pride" (Herpen, 2015). Russian presidential election of 2018 clearly showed a great support of the regime by citizens with 67.5% voter turnout 76.69% voted for Vladimir Putin. Russian people voted for the current regime, despite the variety of antidemocratic initiatives, despite or even due to the wars in Ukraine, Syria, sanctions and anti-disinformation campaign. The Russian elections cannot be representative as their sociology, but voter's reaction before and after them indicates that people of the Russian Federation are mostly satisfied with the regime, its wrongdoing and world reaction, 'betting on' a strong and deceitful leader (Ross, 2018).

And spoken language as a reason for culture differentiation was used in Russian disinformation campaign on the solid basis. People in the modern world are identifying nations mostly by linguistic traits, while the importance of national customs and traditions is reduced in most countries and not considered to be important in the globalization era (Stokes, 2017). And the Russian Federation is constantly forming mass opinion in the world thesis that Ukraine is 'separated' by the language, thus 'Russian speakers' belong to the Russian civilization. And this thesis was repeated not only against Ukraine, but against all the ex-USSR countries that try to normalize the cultural situation after years of forceful 'Russification' that goes on even now. In disinformation campaign of irrational reality, they conceal facts why and how the Russian language and culture was spread in neighbor countries.

Humiliation of foreign nation is done constantly and even in naming Ukraine. In Russian culture Ukraine is not considered to be a country, the cultural tradition of Russians is naming "at the Ukraine", considering Ukraine as a territory, but never saying "in Ukraine" as a norm of the Russian language naming an

independent country. In mass and social media, Russian citizens and Russian culture-bearers humiliate Ukrainian culture and customs, considering Ukrainians as subordinated to the Russian state and Russian people. Russia strips Ukraine of its history, while distorting it and appropriating Ukrainian historical as own, proclaiming that Ukraine is a 'failed state' without its own history. And it's not just a politics and propaganda, but the mass chauvinistic attitude of Russians towards Ukraine and Ukrainians. In general, they resemble patronage towards European and ex-USSR countries, including Ukraine as an imperialistic metropolity attitude toward its colonies ('Disinformation Review' 2018).

Conclusions.

Cultural affinity and way of thinking plays a major role here. Israeli politician, human rights activist Natan Shcharanskyi (GP Van Den Berg, WB Simons - Cal. W. Int'l LJ, 1981 - HeinOnline. The Soviet Union and Human Rights Legislation: The Shcharansky Case) described Soviet people, motivation and ideology: "the Soviet Union was a country that tried to create a breed of people without memory, to deprive them of their identity. And these extreme forms of Bolshevism, which led to the deaths of tens of millions of people, are returned today in the form of postmodernism, without proletarian dictatorship, but with the same idea that people without memory, without religion, without national solidarity, people for whom history means nothing - this is, they say, very good, because then there will be no wars. This is a dangerous philosophy, it makes life meaningless, and people are weak in the struggle for democracy and freedom. Memory is also about very difficult events, which are usually taught and educated much better than positive memories. If a person escapes from the memories of a personal tragedy, he ultimately becomes mentally ill. If a person has the courage to survive, that person becomes stronger. The same thing happens to peoples. Today, every great nation in Europe, including Ukraine, is engaged in a dialogue with itself. And this way of self-search is important. As knowledge of one's own history is an important part of the self-affirmation of the nation and the successful development of the country" (Shcharanskyi 2017). But we can definitely say that without world support and clear understanding of political threats, Ukraine has, it will not stand against Russian aggression in all fronts opened against it - military, economical, mass-media, diplomatic and ethno-cultural including.

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