Sytnyk O. M. Evolution of a hybrid-information war in the context of aggressive policy of the Russian Federation in respect to Ukraine. Challenges of study, conservation and interpretation of historical and cultural heritage: collective monograph. Lviv-Toruń: Liha-Pres, 2019. C. 70–92.

EVOLUTION OF A HYBRID-INFORMATION WAR IN THE CONTEXT OF AGGRESSIVE POLICY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION IN RESPECT TO UKRAINE

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INTRODUCTION

The phenomenon of hybrid information warfare is quite new, but at the same time it has certain sources in history. Finally formed in the XX century, it has every reason to actively develop in the XXI century. And one of the most significant manifestations of the hybrid information war in the modern world is its use in the context of the current aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine.

An analysis of Russian-Ukrainian relations in the post-Soviet space as a manifestation of permanent hybrid aggression by the Russian Federation requires a comprehensive study of the nature and origins of the Kremlin regime's practice of conducting hybrid information wars. Moreover, the term «Kremlin regime» is understood, first of all, as the newest imperial regime of power in the modern RF, which inherited almost all the worst features from the autocratic and Bolshevik totalitarian system.

1. The evolution of hybrid information warfare

At first, the terms «hybrid form», «hybrid» were used in relation to political organizations. That is, it was understood that organizations are not political, responsible for the implementation of precisely political functions.

Now hybrid war is generally understood as military operations that are carried out by combining militaristic, quasi-militaristic, diplomatic, informational, economic and other means with the aim of achieving strategic political goals. The

specificity of this combination is that each of the military and non-military methods of conducting a hybrid conflict is used for military purposes and is used as a weapon. In the modern world, hybrid conflicts and hybrid threats are usually regarded as some sign of a systemic crisis. At the same time, military and analytical circles lack unity in understanding the phenomenon of hybrid warfare. The main question is whether the nature of modern warfare has changed, and are there hybrid methods of warfare with fundamentally new forms of military conflicts, present and future?¹. This became especially relevant with the onset of the hybrid information war unleashed by the Kremlin regime against Ukraine.

It is difficult to determine when the first hybrid war occurred, and in general, whether a similar fact existed before in history. It is clear that now this phenomenon is becoming more common.

It is important to note that the elements of hybrid warfare have been inherent in the usual aggressive practices of the Moscow state since the sixteenth century.

Now the concept of «hybrid war» is characterized by a combination of classical war with elements of terrorism, partisan and cyber warfare, that is, completely different components. In particular, there is an example of Hezbollah's activities carried out during the Lebanon war and other regional conflicts. She did not actively participate in the war, but used rebels, partisans, and so on.

If you look into the distant past, you can find many historical examples that describe such phenomena, for example, the so-called «Scythian war». Therefore, do not attribute the phenomenon of hybrid warfare to the category of fundamentally new in nature, nature and manifestations. However, its current interpretation is significantly different from the previous one².

At the beginning of the XIVth century, the Castilian prince, commander and writer, Juan Manuel first used the term «cold» and «hot» war. Talking about the long struggle between Christians and Muslims on the Iberian Peninsula, he noted that the «cold» from the «hot» war differs in how they end. «Hot» wars end either

² Що таке гібридна війна? Концепція і тактика гібридної війни. URL: http://faqukr.ru/novini-tasuspilstvo/145715-shho-take-gibridna-vijna-koncepcija-i-taktika.html

¹ Світова гібридна війна: український фронт: монографія. Ред. В. П. Горбулін. К.: НІСД, 2017. С. 19, 20.

in death or in peace, while «cold» wars neither peace nor honor to the one who started them³.

As you know, the military strategy includes the following types of wars: small wars, conventional war, regional war. But all these types of touch events when the armed forces of one party are opposed by the armed forces of the other side. In such wars, are used biological, nuclear, chemical, and others who are not the traditional types of weapons, but as a rule, in the classical military engagements, use standard weapons as in the West, «lethal weapons», which, primarily, designed to destroy military forces. There is also the term «symmetrical war», the phenomenon that is the war of the armed forces who are aggressive with different potential opponents, who then become real. A clear example is Afghan war waged by the Soviet Union. So, considering the notion of hybrid warfare, it should be emphasized that this kind of war, uniting a vast range of effects produced by opponent with the use of both military and irregulars involving civilian components. In the writings of military experts, there is close to the term «war of controlled chaos». The term «hybrid threats» has become widespread today, which defines the threats that come from an adversary capable of using traditional and non-traditional tools of hybrid aggression at the same time⁴.

In a certain way, hybrid warfare mean a confrontation arising from technological development, technical growth level defensive tools, offensive weapons, in other words, technologies of warfare. At the same time, significantly changing the objects themselves destruction. They represent not merely the destruction of manpower and destruction of material values. Here the most important weapons are: the influence on the mass consciousness of society, the expert opinions of the persons responsible for making important government decisions, including Ministers, deputies, presidents, when there is a suggestion of

³ Гісем О. В. Всесвітня історія XX ст. Довідник. Кам'янець-Подільський: Абетка, 2003. С. 595.

⁴ Ситник О. М. Гібридний характер російсько-української війни 2014-2017 років та пошук ефективних засобів протидії. *Війна на Донбасі. 2014-2016 рр.: зб. наук. праць за матеріалами Другої Всеукраїнської наукової військово-історичної конференції «Війна на донбасі. 2014 – 2016 рр.»* (м. Київ, 20 квітня 2017 р.). К.: Національний військово-історичний музей України, 2017. С. 136.

certain ideas, the inculcation of values and positions, motivating to perform certain actions. Among other things, hybrid warfare involves a certain armed confrontation. Thus, in addition to traditional weapons, are also used special technology, information, technical and global network device. The concept of hybrid warfare does not reject traditional views on the war, but rather supplements them taking into account dynamic changes in the international security and other relevant factors that affect the methods of warfare. Military analyst F. Hoffman, theorist of the concept of hybrid warfare, which coined the term in a broad appeal came in fact from the thesis of the presence of heredity in the wars of all time, the relevance of historical lessons and methods of warfare and the behavior of enemies, described by Thucydides. At the same time, Hoffman tried to formulate a fundamentally new generalized characteristics of modern conflicts. Central to his conception is the thesis of the strengthening trend of convergence in modern conflicts, which manifested in the rapprochement and interpenetration (conjunction) aspects of war that are usually separate: the physical and psychological dimensions, kineticheskogo and akineticakih weapons, exhibitors and fighting. Convergence covers, in his opinion, regular military forces and proxy groups, it blurs the line between state and non-state actors in the fighting, as well as their unequal armed potentials. This trend is changing shape (modality) of warfare, and the traditional categorical distinction between terrorism and conventional military operations, crime, irregular wars are losing, according to Hoffmann, are of practical importance. Thus, despite the arguments against the term «hybrid war» is impossible to deny that the modern forms of warfare give rise to a significant number of new military, legal, social, moral and other problems requiring urgent solutions. In this context it is considered appropriate to interpret the name «hybrid warfare» as a so-called umbrella term (umbrella term) that covers various aspects of this phenomenon and makes possible the integration and relatively holistic understanding of the wide range associated with diverse and divergent approaches. An umbrella term is, by definition, does not offer a single consistent theory or complementary concepts for all occasions maintaining hybrid fighting. His role is to find common characteristics of hybrid war or the principles of variation sets her signs and also prevent unwanted dispersal of existing approaches and stimulate the search for theoretically sound and effective practical solutions. Another advantage of interpreting hybrid warfare as an umbrella term is to remove the contradiction that arises when using the terms hybrid warfare, hybrid warfare, hybrid threats, hybrid adversaries as contextual synonyms in modern expert studies, doctrinal documents, etc. The basis for synonymization is a sign of the hybridity (confusion, complex combination) of conventional, non-conventional and non-military methods: either in the role of threats, or in the conduct of real hostilities, or as a sign of a potential or real attacker (hybrid adversary). Thus, certain logical and substantive inconsistencies in the concept of hybrid warfare are not an argument in favor of rejecting the term and denying the meaning of its application. This is evidenced by the analysis of the conceptualization of ideas about the nature of modern military conflicts on the basis of a description of a set of new terms that arise in the context of technological and political changes and reflect the directions of existing theoretical research.

Hybrid Wars is a XXIst century phenomenon. But in the history of Russian-Ukrainian relations, their individual methods have been used before. In 1917-1921, many of these techniques were already used by Bolshevik Russia in the struggle against Ukraine. This was the response of the former imperial metropolis to the attempt of Ukrainians to defend their independence, proclaimed in January 1918 by the Central Council. Ukraine did not want the Bolshevik dictatorship, the destruction of democratic freedoms, the «Red Terror» and the return to the control of Russia, now Bolshevik. In response, Ukraine sent regular troops from Russia under the red flag of the communist revolution and the fake slogan «helping the fraternal people in the struggle against the world bourgeoisie». The local «fifth column» of the Bolsheviks and other pro-Russian elements, which were especially active in the southern and eastern regions of Ukraine, helped them in every

possible way⁵. The treacherous tactics of the Bolshevik Russia against its neighbors to fine-noticed K. G. E. Mannerheim served in the Russian army for a long time, having moved from cornet to the General. In his memoirs, this military leader noted that the official sources lot of trouble over that war the Finns have turned into mere civil war. For such inventions is the desire to blame the legitimate government and the army of Finland in the war, but it will not hide the fact that in 1918 the Finns defended the independence of their state. If they hadn't rose to fight, Finland at best, would become the Autonomous oblast of the Soviet Union, without any national freedoms, without real statehood, and they have no place among the free Nations⁶.

In the spring of 1920 the government of Finland allowed the Communists to hold an organizational meeting of the socialist workers party of Finland. Although the secret police, based on irrefutable evidence, demanded to ban the party and to bring its leaders to trial for treasonous activities, but the government did not react. The Communists got the opportunity openly to pursue its organizational activities, to promote and participate in the parliamentary elections of 1922. As a result, the Communists won 22 seats and was able to defend in Parliament his interests, as well as the interests of Moscow.

June 14, 1939 he was shot down during a regular flight from Tallinn to Helsinki, the Finnish passenger plane «Kaleva». It has been proven that «Kaleva» shot down two Russian fighter, and the Soviet submarine EN route to the area, took possession of all the cargo that was in the plane. Except for the Finnish crew were killed and the passengers; they were foreign nationals, and one of them was flying a French diplomatic courier, the bag of mail which was also trophy. This was confirmed in a few years, officer of the submarine who were captured. 27 November 1939, Molotov informed the Finnish Ambassador that the Soviet government no longer considers itself bound by the Treaty of non-aggression. On

⁵ Турченко Ф. Турченко Г. *Проект «Новоросія» і новітня російсько-українська війна*. К.: Інститут історії України НАН України, 2015. С. 146.

⁶ Высказывания маршала Маннергейма, которые как бы обращены к Украине. URL: http://from-ua.com/news/405413-viskazivaniya-marshala-mannergeima-kotorie-kak-bi-obrascheni-k-ukraine.html

the Finnish proposal for the joint investigation of incident with shots of unknown origin in the village of Maynila no attention is paid and distorting the facts, began to argue that the Finnish government was asked to withdraw Russian troops 25 kilometers from the border. In a note dated 29 November 1939, Molotov accused the Finnish armed forces that «they continue to conduct military operations not only on the Karelian isthmus, but also in other areas». December 1, 1939, on the second day of the Soviet-Finnish war, the Soviet information Bureau announced that the «city» of Terijoki, and in fact, in a holiday village located near the border of the formed «people's government of the democratic Republic of Finland». The Prime Minister was elected a Finnish Communist, member of the Secretariat of the Comintern O. V. Kuusinen. The next day in the announcement, the Soviet government stated that the appeal for «assistance» made on behalf of the «people's government». At the same time, it was reported that «the people of the Soviet Karelia now reunited with their Finnish counterparts for the tribe to create a single national state». The Soviet media carried out harsh propaganda against the Finnish government, which was especially aimed at the alleged unrest in this country. At the same time, there was a link to «wonderful living conditions» in Estonia. «Finnish-Soviet society for peace and friendship» did everything possible to prepare the ideological information base in Finland and is actively supported by the Soviet Embassy in Helsinki. Greatly increased the number of employees of embassies and consulates, many of them owned by the Finnish language and actively toured the country, showing a special interest in restricted areas⁷. All of the tools and methods of the Soviet Union, testified not only about the prerequisites of a hybrid war, but also of its actual implementation in the real life and political practice.

2. Modern manifestations of the hybrid information war in the context of the aggressive policy of the Kremlin regime of the Russian Federation

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⁷ Высказывания маршала Маннергейма, которые как бы обращены к Украине. URL: http://froma.com/news/405413-viskazivaniya-marshala-mannergeima-kotorie-kak-bi-obrascheni-k-ukraine.html

Now Putin's actions in relation to Ukraine are very similar to the hybrid practice that the Soviet Union used in relation to Finland in the 1930s and 1940s. Not for nothing that in his memoirs Marshal K. G. E. Mannerheim called the Soviet Union Russia. Therefore, the lines from his memoirs are ideal for our time⁸.

Very similar was Moscow's actions in the Balkan region during the last more than hundred years. The Croatian President Grabar-Kitarovic believes that the Kremlin is involved in a hybrid war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. She said this local newspaper Vecernji List. «Bosnia and Herzegovina still we can't call a stable government, and it still is politically an independent state. The referendum, which was held recently in the Republic of Srpska (part of Bosnia and Herzegovina) was only the first step in a series of possible so-called «referendum», it can lead to the proclamation of independence of Republika Srpska», she said. According to Grabar-Kitarovic, a military confrontation in the Balkans cannot be excluded, because the Russian Federation wants to have power over the events that occur in the region. «We may have a situation in which Russia will begin to bring arms, will conduct intelligence operations and to conduct propaganda in the region», – said the President. It also says that the soldiers of Croatia participate in the NATO action to deter Moscow from provocations. Also Grabar-Kitarovic said that Putin has created such a terrible atmosphere, not all of it can exist. All we need to prove to Russia that we are not so much against it, but primarily want to protect member States of the Alliance – said the President of Croatia⁹. So the modern actions of the Russian Federation in the implementation of manifestations of hybrid war has many analogies in the past.

The resonant world events of recent years, in particular the revolutionary changes in power and armed conflicts in the countries of North Africa, the Middle East and the former USSR, indicate the emergence of new forms and methods that

 $^{^8}$ Маннергейм К. Г. Э. Мемуары; Сайт «Военная литература». URL: http://militera.lib.ru/memo/other/mannerheim/index.html

⁹ «РФ прагне створення «народної республіки» на Балканах»: президент Хорватії занепокоїлася активністю Росії у Боснії. URL: http://patrioty.org.ua/politic/rf-prahne-stvorennia-narodnoi-respubliky-na-balkanakh-prezydent-khorvatii-zanepokoilasia-aktyvnistiu-rosii-u-bosnii-144812.html

the leading states resort to, trying to achieve their foreign policy goals and solve interstate disagreements. Classical military aggression, when the armed forces are used, is replaced by the so-called hybrid wars. They are of a hidden nature and are observed mainly in the political, economic, informational and other specific areas. Military units are used in small numbers to solve individual tasks. The essence of this approach is to shift the focus of the physical destruction of the enemy in a large-scale war to the use of «soft power» against the enemy country in order to disintegrate and change its leadership, including this state in its sphere of influence.

Characteristic features of hybrid wars are:

- aggression without an official declaration of war;
- concealment by the aggressor country of its participation in the conflict;
- widespread use of irregular armed groups (including under the guise of civilians);
- Neglect by the aggressor of international standards of warfare, existing agreements and agreements reached;
- mutual measures of political and economic pressure (with formal preservation of relations between the two countries);
- widespread propaganda and counter-propaganda using dirty information technologies;
 - confrontation in cyber space¹⁰.

There are many well-established ideas about the types of wars. To a large extent, they are representations of the general construct of war as an antagonistic destructive clash of the parties, followed by concretization and reduction to a certain method, regime, form of warfare, which are mainly used as characteristic features of types of wars. New military theories, as a rule, arise along with the emergence of new military phenomena that require the development of the art of warfare in new conditions with new tools. In general, typological theories of war,

¹⁰ Стратегія і тактика гібридних війн в контексті військової агресії Росії проти України. Незалежний аналітичний центр геополітичних досліджень Борисфен Інтел. URL: http://bintel.com.ua/uk/article/gibrid-war/

with some exceptions, are abstract constructs. They are usually based on strategic projections of the future, given that a certain method of warfare becomes, or will become further, universal¹¹.

Now for Ukraine the question of developing and putting into practice defense means and protection against hybrid aggression is a key one. The most developed in modern military science is the theory of conventional or conventional warfare. It can be described as a war using conventional weapons and conventional methods, which is carried out by warring states using regular troops. Such a war consists of operations, which, in turn, include battles and battles of an offensive or defensive nature. In the framework of the theory of ordinary wars in the 1980s, an idea began to form about their stages (generations). The first stage of wars is associated with the massive use of smooth-bore weapons in static, nonmaneuverable battles, the apotheosis of which was the Napoleonic wars. The second stage is associated with the appearance of rifled weapons and the possibility of strategic troop deployment by rail. The use of weapons and human power remained massive. An example is the First World War. The third stage is associated with the appearance of heavy armored vehicles, which allowed for deep tactical and operational maneuvers, sometimes leading to victory in a lightning war (Blitzkrieg). And here a striking example is the Second World War. According to the theory of generations of wars, the first two stages are linear wars, since in them the struggle is through a direct clash of battle formations, or lines. From the third generation we can talk about non-linear war, in which the advantage is achieved by a set of maneuver, tactical and operational skill in using military tools. In this sense, all modern wars are non-linear. Fourth generation wars, military theorists, represented to some extent a futuristic phenomenon, in which breakthrough technical innovations, such as highly effective directional weapons (lasers, electromagnetic guns and the like), remotely controlled devices and operations,

Renz B. Russia and hybrid warfare – going beyond the label. Project «Russia and Hybrid Warfare: definitions, capabilities, scope and possible responses». Funded by the Finnish Prime Minister's Office, government's analysis, assessments and research activities. January 2016. P. 2–4. URL: http://www.helsinki.fi/aleksanteri/english/publications/presentations/papers/ap_1_2016.pdfhttp://www.helsinki

computerized communication, information and observations. Technology was supposed to radically change the forms and methods of warfare. In pure form, examples of such wars still do not exist. However, under the general «heading» of the name of the fourth generation wars, a whole series of more applied theories eventually emerged, in particular a hybrid war. Concept network-centric warfare is purely American. It is associated with the so-called revolution in military affairs (Revolution in Military Affairs, RMA) after the US operation in the Persian Gulf in 1991. Idea network-centric warfare It is to achieve maximum adaptability of troops, thanks to the almost total use of information technology, which is distributed to the level of individual combat units. In such a war, individual units are capable of acting autonomously and simultaneously, in a unified system, to achieve the common goal of victory¹².

One of the causes of the Cold War was the global struggle for the resources of two systems with different types of regulation of industrial relations. It was here that in the warring states there were common features, since the different systems of the USA and the USSR were built on the principles of an industrial society, demanded industrial growth, and hence an increase in resource consumption. Already in 2012, Yu. G. Badakh expressed concern about the actions of the Russian leadership in international relations, their interference in the internal affairs of other states, including Ukraine, which could lead to a new Cold War. Even then, it became clear that the engine of the future war was not ideology, but civilizational incompatibility of different parts of humanity. Since the Russians, especially the older and middle generation, have such a mentality that is constantly looking for the enemy against whom it is necessary to fight. The population of Russia is 140 million people, but the country has one of the largest armies in the world. In Russia, they began to create a new fifth empire, growing for trade in raw materials (mainly oil and gas). She has already begun the rearmament of her armed forces, completed the formation of a global satellite-based guidance system for high-precision weapons for the Kh-555 strategic cruise missiles, deployed Iskander

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¹² Світова гібридна війна: український фронт: монографія. Ред. В. П. Горбулін. К.: НІСД, 2017. С. 23, 24.

mobile missile systems, and military bases abroad, made attempts to form a powerful continental bloc of states that could challenge NATO, drawing China and India there. In 2009, having the Tashkent agreement, Russia created a military-political alliance with seven former republics of the USSR. She opposes European missile defense and is going to modernize her armed forces, spending on it such sums of money that are close to those spent during the Cold War¹³. Therefore, caution was expressed that Ukraine already then you would have to be especially vigilant and remember the «cold war», extract lessons from it. Since the latter Stahl rise to new hybrid forms of warfare.

In General, a typical hybrid warfare consists of three main phases: preparatory, active and final. The first stage is preparatory. In the preparatory phase (which can last for several years) the leadership of the aggressor country, with the active involvement of the security services, measures for the formation of ideological, political and military prerequisites for future aggression. These activities include:

- strengthening of the system of state power in the country, including increasing control over all spheres of its activity;
- indoctrination of its own population for the sake of unification around the ideas of nationalism, great-power chauvinism, defense of the so-called «national values and interests», fighting «external enemy» in a «besieged fortress» and the like, as well as the maximum weakening of the opposition in all its manifestations;
- capture information space of an enemy country and use it to their advantage to develop the appropriate mood;
- the destruction of state power of the country-object of aggression, including: bribery of influential officials, politicians and the security agencies; promotion of agents of influence to positions in state government; fomenting confrontation between different political forces and establish control over them

¹³ Бадах Ю. Г. «Холодна війна». загальний огляд (1946-1991 рр.): [Електронний ресурс]. «Холодна війна»: *історія та уроки. 1946-1991 рр.*».: матеріали Міжнародної наукової військово-історичної конференції, 4-5 жовтня 2012 року, м. Севастополь. URL: http://nvimu.com.ua/wp-content/uploads/Pages.pdf

(primarily, the number of ideologically close and corrupt political parties and movements);

- a split among the population of an enemy country by stimulating the internal contradictions of the political, ethnic and religious nature (in particular, through the creation and support of various parties, movements and relevant organizations, including extremist);

the all – round weakening of the country-object of aggression, undermining public confidence in the authorities and also the spread of protest and separatist sentiments in the society as a method of provoking socio-economic and other problems (including through the use of elements of economic trade and energy wars);

- to discredit the foreign and domestic policy of the country of the enemy, imposing its leadership and population of certain ideas and civilizational values by conducting an active information campaign with the use of special methods of «bombing» companies with extensive involvement of both state and non-governmental organizations.

The second stage is active. In an active phase (usually lasts up to a year) is hidden aggression against a chosen country, with the purpose of achievement of the objectives. To do this, the following steps are provided:

- In the country-object of aggression, illegal armed groups are created from representatives of local anti-government forces, special services, mercenaries and militants are involved in them;
- an internal conflict is provoked in the country on a political, socioeconomic, confessional and interethnic basis, as well as the processes of its development into mass protests of the population, actions of public disobedience, riots and clashes of demonstrators with law enforcement agencies are stimulated;
- Leaders of protest rallies are appointed from among the representatives of opposition political forces at the national or local levels, and they also create alternative «authorities»;

- protesters seize (including with the participation of illegal armed groups and special services of the aggressor country) government buildings and important objects of transport and industrial infrastructure, as well as block the activities of law enforcement agencies (including the use of civilians as human shields);
- regular armed forces of the aggressor are introduced into the territory of the country of aggression under the guise of local armed groups («self-defense units», «militias» and the like) in order to help the opposition and separatists seize power in the state or in its individual regions. In this case, hidden participation of the regular armed forces of the aggressor country in hostilities on the side of the opponents of the current government of the target country of aggression is possible;
- large-scale information campaigns are conducted to support antistate forces in the country-object of aggression, as well as to discredit the actions of his leadership to ensure the constitutional order in the state.

Stage Three – The Final. At the final stage (duration is limited), the aggressor carries out the following work to consolidate its position in the country-object of aggression:

- full support is provided for the new (formerly opposition) power in the country-object of aggression or the separatist regimes in its individual regions (including the creation of government bodies and power structures of separatists)
- assistance is provided in conducting «referenda» on the orientation of the external and internal course of the target country of aggression, the status of its regions, etc., as well as in conducting «elections» of central and local (including separatist) authorities;
- Self-proclaimed state formations in the country-object of aggression are legalized, the processes of resolving the situation on its territory are being dragged out under the guise of mediation in peace negotiations. At the same time, the aggressor country does not in any way recognize itself as a party to the conflict;
- conditions are created to ensure the military presence of the aggressor in the target country of aggression on a long-term permanent basis (in the form of

«peacekeeping forces» or armed separatist formations), as well as for the realization of other, including economic, interests¹⁴. Almost all of these stages took place during the preparation by the Russian Federation of its aggression against the sovereign state of Ukraine. Particularly long, active and purposeful were measures aimed at: ideological treatment of the population of the Russian Federation to direct its consciousness into the mainstream of the ideas of nationalism, greatpower chauvinism, protection of the so-called «national values and interests», the fight against the «external enemy», etc.; the actual occupation of the information space of Ukraine and its use in their own interests for the formation of pro-Russian sentiments; the destruction of the state power of Ukraine, including blackmail and bribery of influential officials, political figures and the leadership of power structures, the promotion of their own agents of influence on positions in state authorities, incitement of confrontation between various political forces and the establishment of control over them; introducing a split among the population of Ukraine by stimulating internal contradictions of a political, interethnic and interreligious nature; comprehensive weakening of Ukraine's aggression, undermining the confidence of its population in their own power, as well as the spread of protest and separatist sentiments in society by provoking socio-economic and other problems, with particular emphasis on the Russian Federation on the artificial provocation of trade, economic and energy wars; discrediting Ukraine's foreign and domestic policy, imposing certain ideas and civilizational values on its leadership and population through an active information campaign using special «zombie» methods of the society with wide involvement of the whole spectrum of various organizations aimed primarily at spreading the ideology of the «Russian world».

It is believed that war is not so much a battle on the battlefield, war is a battle for the minds, for the idea. Moreover, the concepts of «coercion» and «violence» are distinguished. Indeed, armed victory is often a Pyrrhic victory,

¹⁴ Стратегія і тактика гібридних війн в контексті військової агресії Росії проти України. Незалежний аналітичний центр геополітичних досліджень Борисфен Інтел. URL: http://bintel.com.ua/uk/article/gibrid-war/

because it is associated with violence. Violence can change the boundaries (borders) of a part of civilization, violence can force a particular society to follow certain rules of behavior, cause temporary emotional states – horror, fear, fear, but all this is nothing more than an effect on the external manifestations of this society. By the force of influence on the psyche, violence can never be compared with coercion, that is, with that inner state that every psyche accepts consciously, which goes back to the subconscious and forms the value orientation of the individual psyche and entire generations of a particular society. It is here – in influencing individual worldview paradigms (psychological attitudes) and personal sensoryemotional states, that hides the real key to victory over a victim society. Influence on the psyche is tantamount to an influence on parts of the civilizational community, therefore, the deeper and longer this influence, the more stable the new worldview stereotypes and attitudes laid down by propaganda. The power of the information war and its technologies lies in the emphasis on the psyche, on worldviews and value orientations of different generations. The information war provides bloodless decays and unions of individual civilization communities. The manipulation of the sensory and emotional state of the psyche and consciousness is the most effective means of war, which does not lead to temporary changes in the boundaries of individual civilization communities, but in more stable and deep dimensions. In particular, the result is the emergence of a significant group of society, whose representatives are distinguished by a deformed consciousness and psyche, dependent on external information carriers, as a rule – the country of the aggressor.

In addition to reasons of an objective nature (a change in the economic and political realities of the country), subjective reasons also influence the perception of events – primarily those related to the hybrid nature of the war. The hybridity factor provides for a large role of information impacts on the population, which are conducted at all levels of communication, affecting all varieties of worldview. In such a situation, there is a segmentation of public consciousness – the only and consistent picture that would rely on the historical images of the war known to the

population («World War II», «Afghanistan») did not take shape in the mass consciousness. The perception of the war remains extremely mixed – despite significant efforts by state propaganda, the adoption of laws and the activities of civil society activists¹⁵.

The peculiarity of the Afghan war (1979-1989) consists primarily in the fact that a huge mass of the population participated in it, which had never before held weapons in their hands. Recruitment into the ranks of dushmans was led by a wide agent network throughout the country. The advantage of the Mujahideen was the lack of a certain center in them. Throughout the entire armed conflict, it was a combination of many diverse groups. The field commanders led them, but there was no «leader» among them. Many Soviet raids were nullified by the effective propaganda work of the enemy among the local population. For the Afghan majority (especially in deep provinces with a patriarchal order), Soviet troops have always been invaders. Simple Afghans did not feel any sympathy for socialist ideology. Even at the beginning of this war, during the liquidation of Amin, the Soviet special forces used precisely hybrid methods.¹⁶.

As A. Blotsky noted, special cynicism lies in the fact that all wars, especially at the present time, are decided by people who are absolutely confident in their security and impunity. They never risk anything. Neither in Afghanistan, nor in any hot spot of the former USSR, have any of them died. None of them were jailed for resolved insanity. If before – three hundred, five hundred, a thousand years – the leaders of the states personally led their subjects to attack, risking the same as an ordinary fighter, then over the past two hundred years, leaders and inspirers of wars have preferred to sit more and more reliably behind the backs, hiding behind the backs of their vassals. Another thing is ordinary soldiers. They, like a thousand years ago, are familiar at the forefront. Once there, they immediately realize that they can be killed. If someone nearby dies, then the feeling of danger develops into a steady desire to be saved at all costs. And even later, a completely fair and

¹⁵ Там само. С. 50, 275, 320

¹⁶ Що таке гібридна війна? Концепція і тактика гібридної війни. URL: http://faqukr.ru/novini-tasuspilstvo/145715-shho-take-gibridna-vijna-koncepcija-i-taktika.html

logical idea comes that here, in war, this can be done in only one way: to shoot, shoot and shoot again¹⁷.

One of the indicators of hybrid warfare in Ukraine is the use of asymmetric military operations, which are characterized by a significant difference in military force and the strategies and tactics of the participating countries. From the point of view of international law, such a strategy is that Ukraine has no formal reason to fight the aggressor country, which unofficially supports militants and terrorists. When creating the so-called New Russia and resolving the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine, the following were observed: destabilization of the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine through the organization of massive anti-government protests, clashes with law enforcement agencies and supporters of Ukraine's unity, as well as the seizure of administrative buildings; the implementation of the «Crimean» scenario in the Donetsk and Lugansk regions, including the establishment of control over part of their territories, the creation of «militia groups» from among representatives of Russian special services, criminalized law enforcement agencies and local pro-Russian forces; «Legalization» of the so-called Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics (DPR and LPR) by holding appropriate «referenda as well as elections» of their «authorities»; providing Russia with comprehensive support to the separatists, including financing their activities, training militants and supplying them with weapons, military equipment and ammunition, as well as the introduction of Russian troops into the territory of the DPR and LPR; the implementation by the Russian Federation of political and economic pressure on Ukraine, as well as the buildup of the armed forces of the Russian Federation near the Ukrainian border; discrediting Ukraine's military operation against Russian-terrorist groups and the country's disintegration, attempts to present this operation as «punitive against its own population» 18.

¹⁷ Блоцкий О. Психология войны. URL: http://samlib.ru/b/blockij_o_m/psihologijawojny.shtml

¹⁸ Ситник О. М. Гібридний характер російсько-української війни 2014-2017 років та пошук ефективних засобів протидії. *Війна на Донбасі. 2014-2016 рр.: зб. наук. праць за матеріалами Другої Всеукраїнської наукової військово-історичної конференції «Війна на донбасі. 2014 – 2016 рр.»* (м. Київ, 20 квітня 2017 р.). К.: Національний військово-історичний музей України, 2017. С. 140.

Modern Kremlin imperialism did not arise immediately – it took decades to formulate, and no serious attempt was made to stop this formation. Moreover, the Russian Federation was considered by the leading states of the world not as a potential threat to peace and security, but as a quite adequate member of the world community or even as one of its leaders. And so the «reset» of Kremlin imperialism took place. It was the Russian Federation that over the years has been observing interethnic conflicts and manifestations of regional imperialism in the Balkans, conducting protracted and ineffective negotiations, having never found a balanced and generally acceptable solution to the next Balkan crisis, leaving the possibility of its further exacerbation historically open. The Balkans under the influence of external provocation can again ignite. This will close the antagonistic arc in the southeast of the Euro-Atlantic community and make it extremely difficult to comply with international law. Also, it was the Russian Federation that plunged the Middle East into chaos, destroying not so much autocratic dictatorial regimes as the statehood of the Middle Eastern peoples. Thus, instead of democratization, the Euro-Atlantic community received general destabilization in the region, an outbreak of militant fundamentalism and international terrorism, refugee flows and a number of humanitarian disasters, and the Russian Federation was another geopolitical «training ground» for implementing its destructive foreign policy¹⁹.

The policy of hybrid civilizational expansion was not chosen by the Kremlin regime of the Russian Federation by chance, because the bitter feeling of national resentment as a result of the defeat in the Cold War, the collapse of the USSR and the loss of superpower status has not yet disappeared in Russian society. Not risking engaging in an open military confrontation with NATO, Russia carries out hybrid attacks against the West in different directions, successfully using the vulnerabilities of Western democracies.

¹⁹ Власюк О.С. Кремлівська агресія проти України: роздуми в контексті війни: монографія. К.: НІСД, 2017. С. 33, 34.

The Kremlin is not satisfied with the world order that emerged at the beginning of the XXIst century, which is why it seeks to destroy it, plunge into continuous chaos, trying to reformat the system of international relations on more favorable terms for its own globalist project. The first victims of hybrid aggression were the countries of the former Soviet Union, which are the closest neighbors of the Russian Federation, primarily Georgia and Ukraine. If the so-called war of 08.08.08 was predominantly a «normal» military operation of the armed forces, then the hostile actions launched by the Kremlin against Ukraine had a more pronounced hybrid character. Their goal was to destroy (at least a significant decrease) the ability of the state system to defend itself by widely using the initiated protest moods of the population, introducing an «information virus» into the system of values of the mass consciousness, eliminating, bribing, discrediting the country's military and political leadership, etc.²⁰.

One of the modern manifestations of the hybrid information war, which is actively used by the Russian Federation, is a «semantic» war, when the aggressor seeks to level all the national values and priorities of his opponent in the information field. To thus disarm him mentally, morally and psychologically.

CONCLUSIONS

In general, considering the concept of «hybrid war», we can conclude that this is a kind of war that combines a wide range of actions developed by the enemy using both military and irregular formations, in which civilian components also participate. In the writings of military experts, the term «war of controlled chaos» is also close to this.

Modern wars and military-political conflicts have significant differences from previous models. The reasons that give rise to them lie not only in the economic, political or military-strategic spheres. They are also driven by the modern development of the information society.

²⁰ Гібридна війна: in verbo et in praxi: монографія. Донецький національний університет імені Василя Стуса. Ред. Р.О. Додонов. Вінниця: ТОВ «НіланЛТД», 2017. С. 383.

In general, it should be noted that the essence of hybrid warfare is due to a number of factors and trends, among which there are aspects of an objective nature (changing economic, political realities of the country) and subjective reasons – primarily related to the hybrid nature of the war. Hybridity provides for a large role of information impacts on the population, is conducted at all levels of communication, affecting all aspects of the worldview. Also, one of the indicators of hybrid warfare is the use of asymmetric military operations, which are characterized by a significant difference in military force and the strategies and tactics of the participating countries. This is the meaning of hybrid aggression.

In general, it should be summarized that modern methods of conducting hybrid warfare provide, first of all, for the active and comprehensive use of means of information-psychological influence on the enemy. Cyber attacks are increasingly being used as a means of achieving the common goals of the aggressor.

The modern hybrid warfare is universal in nature, because – it is being fought at the information-political, financial, economic and legal levels – hybrids capture territories and infrastructure on the demarcation line, and the Ukrainian government, unfortunately, does not counteract this, motivating with democratic legislation. Therefore, first of all, it is important to change the legislation.

The strategic goal of the enemy's information activity remains large-scale destabilization of the state and the country as a whole, which usually manifests itself in the implementation of various kinds of subversive actions. This is one of the essential prerequisites for the effective implementation of the entire complex of measures of the hybrid information war. Given this, the official priorities of the state information policy are extremely important. Also effective means of counteracting the methods of hybrid information warfare is the active activity of the state in the external information arena and proper opposition to the activities of the special services of the aggressor.

SUMMARY

An attempt is made to consider the evolution of the hybrid information war in the context of the aggressive policy of the Kremlin regime of the Russian Federation. The attention is focused on the fact that the hybrid phenomenoninformation warfare is a relatively new but it has some origins in history and finally formed in the twentieth century, it has every reason to develop in the twenty-first century. Emphasized that one of the most significant manifestations of the hybrid information war in the modern world is its application in the context of the current Russian aggression against Ukraine. This is especially true, because now the Ukrainian government, once again, in the early twentieth century faced with the manifestations of a system of aggression and expansion of the Kremlin regime. It is noted that the nature of hybrid war is caused by several factors, among which are aspects of objective and subjective reasons, primarily associated with the hybrid nature of the war. It is noted that hybridity involves a lot of role information impacts on the population, which are conducted on all levels of communication, affecting all sides of the world. At the same time one of the indicators of a hybrid war is the use of asymmetric fighting, which is characterized by a significant difference in military strength and strategy of the parties involved, what is the meaning of hybrid aggression. Stated that modern methods of waging a hybrid war provide the full and active use of means of information and psychological impact on the enemy and is increasingly used cyber attacks as a means of achieving the overall goals of the aggressor. Summarized that the modern hybrid warfare has a universal character because it is carried out on the information-political, financialeconomic and legal levels – hybrids captured territory and infrastructure on the boundary line, but the Ukrainian government, unfortunately, does not oppose this, citing the democratic legislation. And the strategic goal of information activities of the enemy remains the large-scale destabilisation of the state and the country as a whole, which is usually expressed in the implementation of different kind of Subversion. This is one of the essential prerequisites for effective carrying out of all complex events, hybrid and informational war. Given this, it is extremely important the official priorities of the state information policy. It is also an effective means of countering hybrid methods of information wars is the activity of the state in the external arena of information and appropriate counter-intelligence activities of the aggressor.

Key words: hybrid information war, the aggressive policy, the Kremlin regime, Ukraine, Russian Federation.

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Анотація. Актуальність статті полягає в необхідності всебічного вивчення такого явища, як гібридні війни. Це важливо задля всебічного аналізу їх причин, передумов, особливостей і специфіки гібридно-інформаційних війн. Метою статті є дослідження проблеми поширення такого роду війн у сучасному світі. Насамперед це стосується гібридної агресії з боку РФ щодо України. І зокрема зміст статті стосується розкриття й аналізу сутності та витоків політики Кремлівського режиму РФ щодо ведення гібридно-інформаційних війн.

Ключові слова: гібридно-інформаційна війна, агресивна політика, кремлівський режим, Україна, Російська Федерація.